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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages allegedly resulting from
1 •

tn

'.unal injuries that plaintiff-appellant Austin Hobbs claims
have sustained as a result of a collision with a train

uperated by defendant-respondent The Denver & Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company (hereinafter the "Railroad") at a
railroad crossing in Price, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a trial to the court, Judge J. Dennis Frederick
of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, found
that the Railroad exercised reasonable care, complied with all
applicable statutes, and was not negligent in the operation of
its train or the maintenance of the railroad crossing (Record
on Appeal, hereinafter "R.", at 384-86).

Judge Frederick also

found that the defendant-respondent State of Utah, Department
of Transportation (hereinafter "DOT") exercised reasonable care
and was not negligent in the choice of a detour route or in the
choice of crossing warnings (R. 386).

Judge Frederick found

that Mr. Hobbs was negligent in failing to exercise reasonable
care as he approached the crossing, in failing to comply with
applicable statutory requirements, and in failing to see or
hear what he could have seen or heard with the exercise of
reasonable care.

Judge Frederick found that Mr. Hobbs's

"''t'.ligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident (R.
386-87).
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RELIEF SOUGHT
The Railroad seeks an order of this Court affirming
the judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts in Mr. Hobbs's brief omits
critical facts, includes other facts having virtually nothing
to do with the material issues, and comes perilously close to
misstating other facts about which there was no dispute at
trial.

In reality, the parties disagreed about little at trial

other than the ultimate fact of negligence.

The important

facts addressed at trial, largely undisputed, were the
following:
1.

The Accident Scene and the Parties' Conduct

At about lO:OU p.m. on April 23, 1979, Mr. Hobbs was
driving a tractor-trailer coal truck through Price, Utah, in
connection with his employment (Trial Court Transcript,
hereinafter "Tr.", at 483).
486).

The night was clear (Tr. 344-45,

Mr. Hobbs proceeded north on Price's Carbon Avenue, then

followed a DOT-imposed detour by turning right (east) on Third
South, then left (north) on First East toward the Railroad's
crossing on First East between Second and Third South (Tr.
483-85).

Five sets of tracks cross First East.

As Mr. Hobbs

proceeded northbound across the tracks, his truck collided with
the lead engine of the Railroad's westbound train on the
northernmost or "mainline" track (Tr. 342, 488).
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Unquestionably the most important facts demonstrated
rrial were (1) that the Railroad's train crew properly
,girnled the train's approach to the First East crossing, and
\i)

that Mr. Hobbs had a clear view of the approaching train.

The evidence on these points, summarized below, was not
seriously disputed.
The train crew in the lead engine consisted of the
engineer, seated on the right side of the engine, and the head
brakeman and the Assistant Road Foreman of Equipment, both
seated on the left side (Tr. 399).

The engineer and head

brakeman were both experienced employees (Tr. 358, 366).

The

road foreman, whose job it was to hire and supervise the
Railroad's crews, accompanied the crew on the night of the
accident for the purpose of observing their performance (Tr.
558-60).
On its approach to Price, the train crew lowered the
speed of the train to 40 miles per hour in accordance with the
applicable Price City ordinance (Tr. 563-64).

On the day of

the accident, the Railroad had imposed a "slow order" requiring
its trains to lower their speed to 30 miles per hour at milepost 619.0 (about 100 feet east of the First East crossing).
The crew slowed the train to 30 miles per hour in accordance
with this slow order (Tr. 369-70, 405-06, 564).
As it entered Price, the train had its fixed
headlights, its oscillating headlights, and its bell signal in
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operation (Tr. 413-18,

563-64).

As the train

approached the crossing at Fourth East in Price (three blocks
east of the accident crossing), the crew sounded the customary
whistle signal.

Soon after passing the Fourth East crossing,

the engineer began sounding the whistle signal for the First
East crossing (Tr. 405, 438, 565).

A motorist following about

a block behind Mr. Hobbs was able to see the train's lights
(Tr. 124-25), and the resident of a nearby house could see the
lights and hear the whistle from inside her house (Tr. 151-52).
Mr. Hobbs was familiar with the crossing.
that the northernmost track was the active track.

He knew
He had

crossed the First East crossing once before that same day and
had crossed the nearby Carbon Avenue crossing two or more times
per day during the six years before the accident (Tr. 510-12).
At page 5 of his brief, Mr. Hobbs asserts that as he
"proceeded across the tracks, any vision he might have had down
the trucks was obscured by various objects."

This is not the

position Mr. Hobbs took at trial and it is not supported by the
evidence, including photographs of the scene offered by Mr.
Hobbs's attorney.

(See Exhibit P-6.)

The mainline track is

straight for about three-quarters of a mile to the east of the
First East crossing (Tr. 589).

When Mr. Hobbs approached the

mainline track, he had a clear view of the approaching train
for at least the last 120 feet of his travel toward the track,
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!

for a period of about one second when his view of the

engine may have been obstructed by a boxcar parked on a

rurage track about 120 feet east of the crossing.

After

passing that point, Mr. Hobbs had a clear view of the train for
at least 15 seconds before he reached the mainline track (Tr.
602-06, 609-18; Exhibits D-1, D-40, and D-42 through D-54).
The house, tree, and car that Mr. Hobbs referred to in his
brief as being obstructions could not possibly have obscured
his view of the oncoming train once he neared the crossing.
At the time of the accident, Mr. Hobbs had been
driving his coal truck, a "semi" with two trailers, for more
than nine hours (Tr. 471, 513).
200 miles (Tr. 116).

He had driven a total of about

As he approached the First East crossing

from the south, he slowed his truck to about three miles per
hour, but did not come to a complete stop before crossing any
of the tracks (Tr. 485).

It appeared to the train crew that

the truck was slowing to stop, but that the truck then lurched
as if Mr. Hobbs released his brakes just before reaching the
mainline track (Tr. 566).

A motorist following behind Mr.

Hobbs's truck also noticed the truck lurch (Tr. 125).

One of

the crew members thought the driver of the truck had been
looking in his rearview mirror just before he crossed the
ru&inline track (Tr. 569-70).

Mr. Hobbs testified that he had a

''habit" of watching his trailers in his rearview mirror (Tr.
518) .
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When the head brakeman and road foreman realized that
the truck was about to cruss in frunt of the train, they
immediately alerted the engineer, who immediately activated the
emergency brake (Tr. 432, 566-68).

The police officer who

investigated the accident reported that Mr. Hobbs's failure to
maintain a proper lookout contributed to the accident, and
recommended that a traffic citation be issued to Mr. Hobbs (Tr.
64-67).

The same officer determined that the train engineer's

conduct was not a contributing cause of the accident (Tr. 66).
2.

The Decision to Detour Traffic to First East

The Railroad's tracks also cross Carbon Avenue, which
parallels First East and is the next street to the west.

On

the day of the accident the Carbon Avenue crossing was closed
because of repair work being performed there at the direction
of the DOT (Tr. 165, 217).

The work was funded by State

Transportation money and was performed by Railroad employees
and the State's contractor (Tr. 217, 223).

The purpose of the

Carbon Avenue renovation was to improve the road material and
the warning signals so as to accomodate the heavy coal trucks
at the speed they traveled on Carbon Avenue (Tr. 175-78).
Before the construction began, the DOT called a
meeting of its own officials, city officials, and Railroad
representatives for the purpose of considering how to handle
the construction and diversion of traffic (Tr. 190-91, 218).

r

main alternatives for diversion of traffic were a

1w

; "lll

to the First West crossing or a detour to the First East

cr1Jssing.

The DOT had the ultimate responsibility for making

lhe detour decision (Tr. 218-19).

The DOT determined that the

detour should go to First East for a number of reasons.

There

was less traffic on First East than on First West (Tr.
249-50).

The housing and population of children were less

dense on First East (Tr. 231).

The average speed of traffic

over First East was slower (Tr. 232).

The turns along the

First East detour route were easier to negotiate for large coal
trucks (Tr. 227, 231, 533).

The First East crossing was in

better condition and could more easily accomodate the
additional traffic (Tr. 227-28, 233).

The DOT also considered

the fact that the First East crossing was already equipped with
warning signs and pavement markings (Tr. 201).

The Railroad

imposed a slow order of 30 miles per hour at the DOT's request
and posted a flagman during daylight hours (Tr. 233, 338-39,
353).

The DOT, which has regulatory authority over such

crossings, neither ordered nor requested that the Railroad
provide any additional warning at the First East crossing (Tr.
219-20).
3.

The Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions

The trial court made detailed findings concerning the
conduct of each of the parties and concerning the First East
crossing itself.

Judge Frederick found that the Railroad's
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crew warned of the train's approach by activating the trein's
bells, whistle, and lights fol- the quarter mile before the
First East crossing (R. 384).

He found that the crew members

saw Mr. Hobbs's truck approaching the crossing very slowly, and
that they assumed Mr. Hobbs was about to stop.

When they

realized he was not going to stop, they warned the engineer who
applied the train's emergency brake (R. 385).

On the basis of

these facts and others, the trial court concluded that the
members of the crew were not negligent in the operation of the
train (R. 385).
The trial court determined that the First East
crossing was not extra-hazardous because Mr. Hobbs had a
virtually clear view of the train for the last 120 feet before
he reached the mainline track (R. 385).

The trial court could

find nothing in the configuration of the crossing, in the
volume of traffic or otherwise that might have created an
extra-hazardous condition, with the result that the Railroad
had no duty to post flagmen or additional warnings (R. 386).
With regard to Mr. Hobbs, on the other hand, Judge
Frederick found that he was negligent because he failed to
stop, as he could have, when the approaching train was plainly
visible and was emitting an audible signal (R. 386-87).

In

short, Mr. Hobbs "either failed to look or listen for the train
or failed to heed what he saw or heard as the train approached"
(R. 385).
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ARGUMENT
Utah law clearly defines the respective duties of
:iilroads and motorists in matters of crossing safety.

The

,1verwhelming weight of the evidence adduced at trial was to the
effect that the Railroad met each of its obligations and in
doing so exercised reasonable care.

Mr. Hobbs, on the other

hand, did not exercise reasonable care for his own safety.

He

should have stopped, looked, and listened for the oncoming
train, but he did not.

If he had paid even the slightest

attention to the situation at the First East crossing, he would
have seen the train in ample time to stop.

Judge Frederick

correctly held that Mr. Hobbs's negligence was the sole
proximate cause of his accident and injuries.
Mr. Hobbs does not claim that the trial court made any
error of law, but contests only the trial court's findings of
fact.

As Mr. Hobbs himself recognizes (Appellant's Brief at

12, 14), his burden on appeal is to show that the trial court's
findings are "clearly against the weight of the evidence,"
Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1982), and that
there is "no reasonable basis in the evidence to support [the
findings]."
(Utah 1980).

Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 512, 514
If the trial court's findings are supported by

anv substantial evidence, they must be upheld on appeal.

keimschiissel v. Russell, 649 P.2d 26, 27 (Utah 1982).
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Mr.

Hobbs is simply incorrect i ' arguing that this Court should
impose its own allocation of negligence among the parties (see
Appellant's Brief at 14-18).

The cases he cites merely repeat

the general rule that an appellate court is not authorized to
substitute its own judgment on the issue of negligence for that
of the trial court, and that a new trial on the issue will be
ordered only if the record "clearly shows" that the trial
court's findings were "against the manifest weight of the
evidence."

Kinsey v. Kelly, 312 So. 2d 461, 462 (Fla. App.

1975) (cited in Appellant's Brief at 15).
Not only did substantial evidence support Judge
Frederick's findings that the Railroad was not negligent and
that Mr. Hobbs's own negligence was the sole proximate cause of
the accident; that conclusion was the only one that could
logically have followed from the evidence.

The trial court's

judgment must be upheld.

Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial
Court's Finding that the Railroad's Crew
EXercised Proper Care in Operating the Train.
The settled law in Utah is that railroads have "the
unquestioned right of way" over public railroad crossings
because of the momentum of trains, the confinement of their
movements to the track, and the necessity and public nature of
railway traffic.

Pippy v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 79 Utah
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451, 11 P.2d 305, 310 (1932).

Accord: Lundquist v.

1• 11,tt Copper Co., Inc., 30 Utah 2d 262, 265, 516 P.2d 1182,
1

1

x:, (197 3).

Railroad crew members must, of course, exercise

care to avoid accidents, but they are not required
tu

slow or stop at crossings merely because a car or truck is

approaching.

As this Court held in Pippy v. Oregon Short Line

supra, "Train operators may assume, until the situation
otherwise discloses, that one approaching a railway track will
yield precedent to the right of way and will exercise ordinary
care to take care of himself
P.2d at 310.

II

79 Utah at 451-52, 11

And as the Court held in Lawrence v. Bamberger

Railroad Co., 3 Utah 2d 247, 252, 282 P.2d 335, 338 (1955),
The motorman or engineer operating a train may
assume, and act in reliance on the assumption,
that a person on or approaching a crossing is in
possession of his natural faculties and aware of
the situation, including the fact that a train is
a large and cumbersome instrumentality which is
difficult to stop, and that the person will
exercise ordinary care and take reasonable
precautions for his own safety.
Utah law requires railroads to sound a whistle or a
bell continuously for 80 rods (a quarter mile) before public
crossings.

Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (Supp. 1981); Curtis v.

Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978).
Since the Railroad's crew properly sounded both the train's
whistle and its bell as it approached the First East crossing,
Railroad fully discharged its statutory duty.
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The Railroad

had the right to assume that Mr. Hobbs would see the train's
lights, hear the bell, hear the whistle, and would stop.
The trial court also correctly held that the Railroad
was not negligent with regard to the design of the locomotive
cab.

Two crew members other than the train engineer were

watching Mr. Hobbs's truck as it approached the crossing.
crew's view of the truck was not obstructed.

The

It was only after

the truck appeared to lurch toward the mainline track that the
head brakeman and road foreman suspected that Mr. Hobbs did not
see the train and alerted the engineer to stop.

Nothing in the

design of the locomotive had anything to do with the collision.
II.
Substantial Evidence Supported The Trial
Court's Finding that the Railroad Exercised
Proper Care in Maintaining the Railroad
Crossing.
The Railroad's duty to maintain the First East
crossing extended only to the area within 24 inches on either
side of the tracks; the DOT or other government entities
maintain the remaining area around the crossing (Tr. 311-13).
The DOT was responsible for choosing the the detour route and
any necessary warning signals (Tr. 217-20).

Thus, insofar as

Mr. Hobbs claims negligence in the choice of the detour route or
warning signals, his claims must be addressed to the DOT, not
the Railroad.

His only claim with regard to maintenance of the
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,, 1,,,

themselves is that they could be crossed at a maximum

-;'ce<i of only five miles per hour.

If, however, Mr. Hobbs

tailed to see the train while he was driving at a speed of
three to five miles per hour, he certainly would not have seen
the train if he had been speeding across the tracks at 30 miles
per hour.

The fact that Mr. Hobbs was required to proceed

across the tracks at a cautious speed cannot be imputed to the
Railroad as negligence.

In other words, Mr. Hobbs did not show

at trial and cannot now logically demonstrate a causal link
between the condition of the tracks and the occurrence of the
accident.

III.
Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial
Court's Finding that First East was not an
Extra-hazardous Crossing Requiring
Additional Warning Devices.
There was nothing about the First East crossing that
created any duty to give warnings of the presence of the
crossing or the train other than those already there.

The

train's lights, bells, and whistles were plainly visible and
audible.

Mr. Hobbs knew that the tracks were there, his view

0£ the tracks was unobstructed, and he was further alerted to
their presence by warning signs and pavement markings.

All of

signs and warnings were more than adequate to alert him
Lu the presence of the

tracks and the train and to the danger

in crossing the tracks.
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In Utah, train tracks themselves are sufficient
warning of trains and the ordinary hazards incident to their
approach.

Lundquist v. Kennecott Copper Co., Inc., 30 Utah 2d

262, 266, 516 P.2d 1182, 1184 (1973); Pippy v. Oregon Short
Line R. Co., 79 Utah 439, 452, 11 P.2d 305, 310 (1932).
Additional warnings of the possible presence of trains are not
required unless something about the crossing causes it to be
more than ordinarily hazardous or "extra-hazardous."

Bridges

v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 26 Utah 2d 281, 283-4, 488 P.2d
738, 739 (1971).

In the present case, there were no such

unusual hazards.

The tracks were plainly visible, and Mr.

Hobbs knew they were there.

The tracks were straight and flat

and the approach on First East was straight and flat.

Nothing

obstructed a motorist's view of the tracks or of any
approaching train for the last 120 feet toward the mainline
track.

The traffic on First East was very light at that time

of night, and Mr. Hobbs admitted that he saw no other traffic
at the time of accident (Tr. 529-30).
The Railroad employed a flagman at the First East
crossing during business hours.

Mr. Hobbs testified that he

could not recall having seen the flagman when he passed the
crossing on the morning of the accident, so he placed no
reliance on the presence of a flagman that could impose on the
Railroad any duty to maintain a flagman after the busy traffic

-14-

1,,,,,rs.

Even if Mr. Hobbs had seen the flagman, however, that

' ulone would not impose on the Railroad any duty to
,,,a 1 Main

a flagman round-the-clock, since the crossing itself

wliS not extra-hazardous.

Gregory v. Denver & Rio Grande

Western Railroad Co., 8 Utah 2d 114, 117, 329 P.2d 407, 408-9
( 1958).

Finally, the single boxcar located on a storage track
about 120 feet east of the crossing did not create an
extra-hazardous crossing.

The evidence showed that Mr. Hobbs's

view of the approaching train could have been obstructed for no
more than one second, after which he had an additional 15
seconds in which to look and listen for the lights, bells, and
whistles of the approaching train.

Significantly, Mr. Hobbs

testified that he could have stopped his truck within three
feet if he had seen the train (Tr. 515).

The overwhelming

weight of the evidence was that he could have seen the train,
both before and after he passed the distant boxcar, in plenty
of time to stop.

IV.

Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial
Court's Finding that Mr. Hobbs was Negligent
and that his Negligence was the Sole
Proximate Cause of his Accident.
Under Utah law, every motorist who approaches a
railroad crossing has certain clearly defined duties the
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violation of which is negligence as a matter of law.
41-6-95(a) o•

Code Ann.

Section

(1981) provides in part:

Wh· .iever any person driving a vehicle approaches
a ailroad grade crossing, the driver of such
vc.<icle shall stop within fifty feet but not less
than ten feet from the nearest track of such
railroad [crossing] and shall not proceed until
he can do so safely when:

** *

(3) A railroad train approaching within
approximately 1,500 feet of the highway crossing
emits a signal audible from such distance and
such train by reason of its speed or nearness to
such crossing is an immediate hazard.
(4) An approaching train is plainly visible and
is in hazardous proximity to such crossing.
Since, in the present case, the Railroad's train emitted an
audible signal and was plainly visible to anyone who bothered
to look from the First East crossing, Mr. Hobbs had the duty to
stop his truck until he could proceed safely.

"This is his

duty at all times and on all occasions, whether his view be
obstructed or unobstructed," and his violation of this duty is
negligence as a matter of law.

Lundquist v. Kennecott Copper

Co., 30 Utah 2d 262, 266, 516 P.2d 1182, 1184-85 (1973).

"'If

a traveler, by looking, could have seen an approaching train in
time to escape, it will be presumed, in case he is injured by
collision, either that he did not look, or, if he did look,
that he did not heed what he saw.
negligence per se. "'

Such conduct is held

Wilkinson v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 35

Utah 110, 116, 99 P. 466, 468 (1909) (quoting Mann v. Belt
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RHilroad
, 1K'!l)).

Stock-Yard Co., 128 Ind. 138, 142, 26 N.E. 819, 820
Accord: Benson v. Denver and Rio Grande Western

1i11lroad Co., 4 Utah 2d 38, 42, 286 P.2d 790, 792 (1955).

In

uther words, Mr. Hobbs was charged by law with having seen and
heard what he could have seen or heard if he had exercised the
proper degree of care.
The evidence at trial was undisputed that Mr. Hobbs
could have seen and heard the Railroad's approaching train if
he had made any effort to do so.

The fixed and oscillating

headlights were in operation, the train's bell was ringing, and
the engineer blew the train's whistle repeatedly as the train
approached the First East crossing.

Witnesses who were not

approaching the crossing testified that they saw and heard the
train, even though they were under no duty to look out for a
train.

Mr. Hobbs himself admitted that he could see and hear

the train just before the collision.

Under these circum-

stances, his failure to see what could plainly have been seen
and heard, and his failure to stop short of the tracks,
constituted negligence per se.

Substantial evidence supported

the trial court's finding that Mr. Hobbs was negligent and that
his negligence was the sole proximate cause of his accident.
CONCLUSION
The Railroad exercised reasonable care in operating
train and in maintaining the First East crossing.
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Mr.

Hobbs, on the other hand, failed to exercise reasonable cure in
approaching the First East crossing because he failed to see
the approaching train that could have been seen and heard by a
reasonably cautious person exercising due care for his own
safety.

Since the trial court's judgment was supported by

substantial evidence, the defendant Railroad respectfully
requests that this Court uphold the trial court's judgment.
DATED this _wCaay of

Q,,

1983.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
Alan L. Sullivan
Jeffrey E. Nelson
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